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ABSTRACT
With the recent advances in the power grid system connecting to the internet, data sharing,
and networking enables space for hackers to maliciously attack them based on their
vulnerabilities. Vital stations in the smart grid are the generation, transmission, distribution,
and customer substations are connected and controlled remotely by the network. Every
substation is controlled by a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system
which communicates on DNP3 protocol on Internet/IP which has many security
vulnerabilities. This research will focus on Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3)
communication which is used in the smart grid to communicate between the controller
devices. We present the DNP3 SAv5 and design a secure architecture with Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) on Asymmetric key encryption using a Certificate Authority (CA).
The testbed provides a design architecture between customer and distribution substation
and illustrates the verification of the public certificate. We have added a layer of security
by giving a password to a private key file to avoid physical tampering of the devices at the
customer substations. The simulation results show that the secure communication on the
TLS layer provides confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Smart grid Introduction
Smart Grid referred to as the modernized power grids which connect different kinds of
generations’ plants to transmit and

distribute to various customers connected in a grid-

like architecture. Central aspects of this smart grid are to connect the smart technology
which gives advanced control methods and secure system architecture for two ways of
communicating with customers. The primary goal is to give information and control to
every endpoint connected to the grid using internet on secure architecture. Smart grids use
the latest technology to produce energy which reduces less carbon and uses new technology
to optimize power for efficient energy resources. Smart Grid has 4 phases which are
Generation, Transmission, Distribution, and Customers, which have their substation to
control and manage the station using the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems and appliances by A. Leonardi et al. [1]

Figure 1. Smart Grid Architecture
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Phase 1 of Generation of power is generated by Thermal, Solar, Nuclear and Wind, and at
each generation plant, there is switchyard substation located to control, manage and send
to the second phase. In the second phase, Transmission has system substation which
receives electricity from the generation plant and sends to the third phase for Distribution.
Here the distribution of electricity is distributed to the customer directly by remote control
and calculation of smart technology with the help of internet. There are different types of
customers which are of small scales such as rural cities, farms, small-scale industries,
factories or businesses and others such as smart homes.
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CHAPTER II
SCADA SYSTEM BACKGROUND

2.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
Power grid substation manages and automates using Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) which is a critical point in monitoring and controlling the process
high-level management at the Industrial Control Systems. They include different kinds of
controllers and peripheral devices to communicate on the Internet. They include different
kinds of controllers and peripheral devices such Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC),
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED), sensors, meters,
embedded computers, Human Machine Interface (HMI) and field simulators.

Figure 2. SCADA Architecture
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2.2 Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)
PLC is used in the industrial automation for the electromechanical process to control and
automate the machinery connected to meters, sensors, alarms and collect the data from
them based on pre-programmed parameters. This digital computer can be connected to a
Human Machine Interface (HMI) and interact in real time to send and store the data. The
physical connection can be communicated on several network devices and communication
protocols such as IEC61850, Modbus and Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) on
Ethernet/IP, Ethernet TCP/IP, Modbus TCP/IP, and ProfiNet by Gordon Clarke et al. [22].
PLC is designed on vendor specific and can have a web server which can be connected to
web browser also.

Figure 3. Programmable Logic controller (PLC) usage in Industrial Control Systems

2.3 Remote Terminal Units (RTU)
RTU is a field digital and analog controller which transmits messages to the master system
using a SCADA system to control the connected objects. RTU’s are used in different kinds
of industries such as power, oil, gas, water, Hydro-graphic sewage systems and other
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environment monitoring systems. RTU can communicate on multiple devices connected to
them either in serial or using communication protocol such as IEC61850, Modbus and
Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) on Ethernet/IP to interface any software or SCADA
systems. The typical architecture communicates as Master and slave/outstation.

Figure 4. Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) usage in Industrial Control Systems

2.4 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED)
IED’s are connected to the meters, sensors, alarms to sense voltage, frequency and current
to control them by raising voltage or decreasing to maintain in the desired level. RTU
connected to the IED can control and send the command to control the field simulators.
Digital Protective relay, such as microprocessors like IED’s were used in the substation
automation for advanced communication in the smart grid.
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2.5 Human Machine Interface (HMI)
HMI is considered as an interface between a User and Machine to control and monitor by
visualizing them in real time on graphical interface more specific to manufacturing or
process control system. An HMI connected to PLC will be connected to the driver to
monitor the field simulators to communicate and increase the efficiency by centralized
control systems. HMI is used explicitly in SCADA systems to monitor and control data on
the graphical user interface digitally. They can communicate with different kinds of
protocols such as TCP/IP, DNP3, LAN, WAN, modem, and satellite.

2.6 Communication Protocols Used in SCADA – Power Grids
A communication protocol is a system of rule syntax that allows transmitting messages
from one entity to another entity using a combination of hardware and software in
semantics and synchronization. These communication protocols are authorized as a
standard for electronic smart grids by the National Institute of Standard and Technology
(NIST) and IEEE recommended [28]. These protocols can communicate on different
interfaces such as Transport Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP), Ethernet,
Bluetooth, 3G which was presented in Byron Flynn [2]. The Standard communication
protocols which smart grids use in the communication of peripheral devices are IEC 61850,
Modbus, and IEEE 1815 (DNP3).
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2.7 Modbus
Modbus is an Ethernet, Internet protocol suite used as a communication protocol for
industrial applications used for PLC and RTU in the SCADA systems. It is updated and
managed by the Modbus organization when the Schneider Electric gave their rights to that
organization. They are used for the serial connections interfaces such as RS 232 and RS
422 and RS 485. They communicate with different protocols such as TCP/IP, UDP, ASCII,
Modbus RTU and some vendor-specific protocols designed for the clients.

Figure 5. Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) usage in Industrial Control Systems
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2.8 IEC 61850
This protocol can be mapped to other protocols to be used for the intelligent electronic
devices

used

at

the

electrical

substations

and

is

a

part

of

the

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) technical committee. IEC 61850 run on
LAN, TCP/IP, Ethernet and other high-speed networking to transfer data to be mapped and
designed as global standard communication for different countries in electric utilities.

Figure 6. Intelligent Electronic Devices Connection Topology
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2.9 IEEE 1818 Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3)
DNP3 is an open standard protocol used as a communication protocol between process
automation and control system in electric and water substations. Designed by the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) for the OSI layer three used in the field
simulators as a communication protocol. The multilingual feature of DNP3 that allow any
proprietary protocol to communicate with it allowed many to upgrade their network to
DNP3. It can work on different communication networks such as LAN, WAN, Ethernet,
TCP/IP is a crucial feature to send messages to its geographical locations. It plays a crucial
role in SCADA system communication which is used by SCADA master, RTU’s, IED’s,
PLC’s and other inter-master station communication.

Figure 7. Intelligent Electronic Devices Connection Topology
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The model is based on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model that is a seven-layer
model and contains an application layer, data link layer, and physical layer. DNP3 also
uses these three layers, plus an additional layer called the pseudo-transport layer which
performs the limited functions of the transport layer and network layer of the OSI model.

Figure 8. DNP3 TCP/IP Connection with SCADA

DNP3 can be designed in a few typical architectures such as one-on-one, Multi-drop,
Hierarchal, Data Concentrator. At the top is a simple one-on-one system having one master
station and one outstation. The physical connection between the two is typically a dedicated
or dial-up telephone line. Multi-drop design. One master station communicates with
multiple outstation devices. Conversations are typically between the master and one
outstation at a time. Multi-drop communications are peer to peer. In the Hierarchical
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architecture, the device in the middle is often termed as sub-master in DNP3 protocol
primer [27].

Figure 9. DNP3 Connection Topologies

DNP3 supports physical communications such as RS 232/485 and also TCP/IP. It supports
sending data as blocks and file transferring can be done in large data blocks. DNP3 is an
open standard which enables the organization to design and secure the communication
according to the industry needs. Evaluation of the performance and cyber application in
smart grid were analyzed in the research proposed by Alcides Ortega et al. [17].
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2.9.1 DNP3 Version
1. 1379-2000 - IEEE Recommended Practice for Data Communications Between Remote
Terminal Units and Intelligent Electronic Devices in a Substation.
2. Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) - IEEE Standard for Electric Power Systems
Communications.
3. Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) - 1815-2012 - IEEE Standard for Electric Power
Systems Communications.

2.9.2 DNP3 IEEE Secure Authentication
DNP3 security authentication (SA) identifies the message source and assigns application
layer functions and data objects that allow the device to authenticate DNP3 communication
messages and verifies that the message has been transmitted without modification. This
protocol is designed to be highly reliable but is not designed to be secure from hackers and
other malicious attacks that may interfere with the control system to avoid using critical
infrastructure. The protocol was designed to be very stable but not designed. It is safe from
hackers and other malicious attacks that can interfere with the control system to prevent
the use of critical infrastructure. DNP3 Secure Authentication from Jacques Benoit [14]
provides services to authenticate the sender and the content of messages. DNP3 Secure
Authentication is based on the IEC 62351-5 security standard.
The “de facto reference implementation of IEEE 1815-2012” OpenDNP3 is the only Open
Source DNP3 implementation, and it is maintained by Adam Crain [9] of Automatak, who
has been adding TLS layer and DNP3 SAv5 support to his stack.
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2.9.3 DNP3 Secure Authentication versions and release
DNP3 Secure Authentication Version 2 (SAv2) was first released as part of IEEE STD
1815-2010. DNP3-SAv2 has been deprecated and superseded by DNP3 SA Version 5
(SAv5) included in the most recent release of the DNP3 standards (IEEE Std. 1815-2012)
[31].
DNP3-SA is based on the international standard IEC 62351-5 which was test by Raphael
Amoah et al. [5]. Which in turn is based on several different standards issued by the
International Standards Organization (ISO), International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) the Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF) and the U.S. National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and Richard Duncan from SANS Institute [13]. Secure
Authentication Version 5:

2.9.4 Version 5 adds cryptographic algorithms not supported by
Version 2 as follows
1. Instead of minimum length 4 of an HMAC can change to 8 octets in DNP3
2. It makes SHA-256 a mandatory hash algorithm, and the default.
3. It makes it a requirement that configuration can disable the use of SHA-1.
4. It changes the mandatory TLS cipher suite to one supported by TLS version 1.2.
5. It clarifies which pseudo-random number algorithm should be used.
6. It permits the use of the AES- 256 Key Wrap algorithm optionally.
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7. It optionally permits the use of the AES MAC algorithm for calculating MACs. Using
this algorithm places some additional rules on the rest of the protocol by IEEE [31].
8. The Version 5 specification now uses the generic term MAC instead of HMAC since
HMAC is a specific type of MAC which was mentioned by Cas Cremers et al. [4] and
by IEEE standard [30]:

In this research, Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) is focused as the central aspect of
the communication in SCADA systems because it is considered as the most commonly
used power grid protocol in North American Utilities for distribution and DER
communications. Modbus protocols used in the power grids are vendor specific and are
commercially licensed whereas IEC 61850 is used less when compared to DNP3 as it is an
open and public protocol which can be designed according to the smart grid requirements.
DNP3 Secure Authentication version 5 is focused on this research as it is the new standard
and supports Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This model is a novel work where PKI
implementation on DNP3 SAv5 and design of the architecture to how securely identify the
authenticity of machines are communicating.

26

CHAPTER III
RELATED WORK
This chapter mainly focuses on the research done on the communication protocol used in
the power grid, DNP3 and its vulnerabilities which are penetrated by the attackers.
Recommendations for securing the architecture from research done on DNP3 are a
symmetric connection and TCP/IP communication which are related to the research
presented in this thesis.

In [1], A. Leonardi, K.Mathioudakis, A. Wiesmaier, and F. Zeigar has described the smart
grid architecture and technology and how the substation automation plays a significant
aspect for the security vulnerability in the power grid mainly because of the remotely
accessible devices placed within substations and customer locations on outside network
infrastructure. Specifically, this paper discussed the communication protocol IEC 61850
and utility applications that typically run at the control center in transmission or distribution
center which lacks the physical and cybersecurity.

In [2] Byron Flynn, mentioned different kinds of real-world architectures used in SCADA
which include various methods of user authentication and secure access to the substation
connections and servers. He mentioned their advantages and disadvantages on how security
would be a vital part in secure system operation and centralized access right control.
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In [3] Ihab Darwish, Obinna Igbe, Orhan Celebi, Tarek Saadawi, Joseph Soryal have
highlighted different vulnerabilities and security threats in DNP3 as real-time automation.
They have shown TCP connection used in DNP3 which was released in 2010 and
experimented on virtual computer environment to show its security issues and gave
suggestion to use Intrusion Detection System which will be useful to identify the
cybercriminal targeting the substations in the Smart Grid Infrastructure.

In [4] Cas Cremers, Martin Dehnel-Wild, Kevin Milner, have considered DNP3-SAv5 and
symbolic modeling on the protocol’s three sub-protocols. The cross-protocol attacks which
are mentioned by them in their previous research have been analyzed again and were
unsuccessful on the SAv5 version due to its security properties. This research has to lead
to different recommendations for improving the future versions of DNP3 in building block
for power substation communication.

In [5] Raphael Amoah, Seyit Camtepe, Ernst Foo, have proposed the lightweight security
scheme for broadcasting mode communication based on hash chain using update key
process on DNP3 SA. The proposed scheme is verified using the most common protocol
attacks such as modification, replay and injection attacks using the symmetric key as
DNP3-SA key update process.

In [6] Carlos Lopez, Arman Sargolzaei, Hugo Santana, Carlos Huerta, have researched
smart grid infrastructure for power and generation for the integration of advanced
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communications and networking for monitoring and controlling them. They have revised
different kinds of cyber threats associated with these critical infrastructure SCADA
systems and these attacks are identical in attack but applied according to their different
types of smart grid. A different number of computational, and experimental algorithms are
proposed which can improve the security in the smart grid.

In [7] Dongsoo Lee, HakJu Kim, Kwangjo Kim, Paudl D. Yoo, have simulated the DNP3
SA with pre-shared keys using either symmetric or asymmetric key and find various ways
to attack this system. Lack of confidentiality made them propose the DNP3 Authenticated
Encryption for both authentication and encryption. Their testbed was tested on three
devices and also Prince Algorithm as not implemented to test and to get more precise and
helpful results.

In [8] Samuel East, Jonathan Butts, Mauricio Papa, and Sujeet Shenoi have done their
research on the DNP3 and their vulnerabilities which provided the attack taxonomy which
clarifies the nature and scope of the threats to DNP3 systems. The attack taxonomy also
provided insights into the relative costs and benefits of implementing mitigation strategies.

In [11] Marcio Andrey Teixeira, Tara Salman, Maede Zolanvari, Raj Jain, Nader Meskin
and Mohammed Samaka have done research on network packets which are cyber-attacks
done on a test bed environment and this dataset is trained with Machine Learning
algorithms to detect the attacks in the real time.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, we demonstrate the research methodology and model of the proposed
secure architecture of DNP3 SAv5 using Public Key Infrastructure for authenticity
verification using Public Certificate or Public Key of entity it is communicating. Also,
illustrate the real world system with their vulnerabilities and simulated attacks on DNP3
Secure Authentication and analyze these vulnerabilities. Further, explain the proposed
scheme Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which was introduced by Prof. More V.N. [12]
and enhancement of DNP3 security using the public certificate verification using the root
certificate authority (CA) or a substitute CA.

In the smart grid, we focused on a particular aspect where the distribution substation
connected to customer substation where at this state, the design architecture of the
connection varies with the customer substation with the size of the customers. The
customer substations can be of different types such as Industrial plants, smart homes, cities
or others. Substation model can be of different types depending on the size of the city or a
smart home community.
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Figure 10. Distribution to Customer Substation Connection

4.1 Model of SCADA Substation
The Hierarchical model used in the SCADA substation where the master connected to a
set of outstations and some of the outstations can also act as a Master in this model which
was shown by Abdulmalik Humayed et al.[10]. In the distribution substation model, it has
a SCADA master controlling and collecting the data in the data storage with remote
connections connecting on Local Area Network (LAN). The below hierarchical model
depicts the distribution substation connecting to a smart home connected to the smart grid.
The connection between the smart homes and distribution substation as illustrated below,
and the protocol used to communicate here is DNP3 on internet/IP address. DNP3
communication on TCP communication has the side effect of cybersecurity issues which
enables a hacker to penetrate the weak points at the SCADA system which are surveyed in
the Wenye Wang et al. [21].
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Figure 11. Attack points on SCADA Architecture

The attack point shows the vulnerable places where hackers penetrate the system.
Connections on LAN area connection on DNP3 using TCP/IP communication would allow
a hacker to make a replay or MITM attack to spoof the messages communicating on DNP3
which are introduced in Chih-Che Sun et al. [15]. The customer substation should also be
secured from the physical attacks which can have a connection to the SCADA system
which allows them to penetrate them from remote location remotely.
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4.2 PKI Structure Scenarios
In SCADA there were many types of connections, and our design model for DNP3 SAv5
with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can implement for all using the Certificate Authority
(CA) as the third party or as can be used in the SCADA master. In this model, Public
certificate plays a significant part in the verification of the entity during a physical or a
malicious attack using the internet on the device communicating on DNP3. The root
Certificate Authority (CA), the interim or Sub-CA can verify the entity sent by Master or
Outstation it is communicating. By this verification, the entity can know the authenticity
of the device and the certificate here is password protected. PKI also provides the TLS
encryption, authentication, and authorization which made our model secure and
verification of the certificate or public key can validate the authenticity of the entity.

4.3 Attacks points and Vulnerabilities on DNP3
The SCADA systems communicating on DNP3 have physical and cyber system challenges
which are addressed by Samuel East et al. [8] such as passive network reconnaissance,
baseline response reply, and rouge interpreter. These frequent attacks can modify or
fabricate the DNP3 messages, and the entity assumes as these messages are valid. They
have introduced the three common attacks with 21 attack instances which can potentially
operate malicious operations on the entity devices. Irfan et al. [1] studied the attack
instances and discussed the attacks mitigations for the configuration cipher attacks, length
outer flow attack, and flag function unavailable attack and also Man in the middle attacks.
Humayed et al. [3] have discussed the operating system vulnerability in PLC and RTU at
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remote stations, communication vulnerabilities such as 23 attacks which exploit the
absence of encryption, authentication, and authorization. Yilin Mo [4] have explained
different attack entities where an attacker can penetrate using such as the malicious media,
network-based

intrusion,

compromised

supply

chain,

and

malicious

insider.

Confidentiality of meter usage and commands, the integrity of price information,
penetrating the device to perform a Denial of Service. The attack trees are also studied in
various research and introduced in Eric J.Byres et al. [16]

4.3.1 Malicious Insider
A legitimate user, employee or an ex-employee who has access to the physical devices,
SCADA systems, or has the VPN access to the field devices and uses for his malicious
purposes can call as a malicious insider. The malicious insider is dangerous and also a
threat to the smart grid which was shown in by Adnan Anwar et al. [20]. The access
control should also monitor who can access the network and authenticity of the person
using needed to be verified.

4.3.2 Tampering Physical System (Unauthorized User)
Any unauthorized user trying to penetrate the device physically would be a threat to
the whole SCADA system and the smart grid. The devices which are at the customer
substations such as smart meters or remote RTU’s, PLC or smart homes are vulnerable
to physical tampering. A remote device when penetrated can be used as a malicious
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entity to destroy or can alter the data which is communicating to other substations. The
mitigation to secure these remote devices also plays a significant role in securing the
system

4.3.3 Man in the Middle Attack
Darwish et al. [3] have an experimental study on the DNP3 performing penetrating
testing such as Man in the Middle (MITM) attack by simulating the attack on an
Ethernet switch. This vulnerability would allow an attacker to intercept and inject a
packet for malicious purposes. Eavesdropping is an example of a MITM attack where
an attacker relays messages between connections and make them believe that they are
communicating with each other by Rajendra Kumar Pandey et. Al. [19]. Mitigation of
MITM would be mutual authentication and Transport Layer Security (TLS) with
encryption as well as issuing digital certificates. When two entities are talking to each
other, and a malicious thing intercepts and eavesdrop the conversation in the form of
sniff and spoof for malicious purposes. Digital Certificates can prevent this.

Figure 12. Man in the Middle Attack
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4.3.4 Distributed Denial of Service
East et al. [8] have warned about the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) as a cyberattack which the attacker can make the machine unavailable for intended users
temporarily. DDoS is typical can be accomplished by flooding messages on the targeted
device using the network and which make the application for denial of service. The
simplest type of botnet attack is to flood an ordinary Web site with bogus messages,
blocking or slowing the normal flow of information. These “denial of service” attacks
could also be used to slow traffic moving between the control station and substations.

Figure 13. Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS)
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4.4

Authentication Mechanism – Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI)

DNP3 SAv5 supports Secure Authentication which allows the end to end cryptogaic
authentication on the TLS layer with advanced encryption. In our design we have used
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which provides the SCADA users to produce, manage,
distribute, store, revoke digital certificates using public certificates. PKI is used in many
platforms for secure electronic transformation for a range of activities such as e-commerce,
internet banking and also in the confidential email. PKI relies on asymmetric key
encryption using public key cryptography.

In our design, we have used public key cryptography with asymmetric key encryption.
Each user communicating on the asymmetric key encryption will choose their private key,
and later a public key is obtained from the private key cryptographically. One key in the
pair is shared between every entity, and it is called as a public key, and the private key is
kept secret. One key is used to encrypt, and another key is used to decrypt and many
protocols such as digital signature, SSH relies on asymmetric cryptography.

Figure 14. Asymmetric Key Distribution for Users
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PKI issues digital signatures which refers to a set of algorithms and encryption methods
which used to determine the authenticity of the document, software or message. A digital
signature provides non-repudiation in which a user cannot deny sending the message and
integrity of the message was not altered in the transit. There are two main properties which
make PKI secure. First, the authenticity of signature from the message and fixed private
key is verified using a public key, and secondly, it is computationally infeasible to generate
a valid signature for an entity without the entity’s private key. The author of the message
to attach a code that acts as a signature is the authentication mechanism in the digital
signature. The digital signature has various details of the entity which is created by the
certificate authority (CA) which is the root of handling the PKI infrastructure.

Figure 15. Digitally Generated Certificate
Certificate Authority (CA) is a trusted entity which can be third party or a trusted entity
such as a SCADA master in the design that issues electronic documents to the entity that
verify a digital identity on the internet. The electronic certificates typically include validity,
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time, owner’s name, and other information of the public key owner. Usually, operating
systems (OS) and Web browsers maintain the list of trusted CA root certificates to verify
that the CA issues and signed the certificates.

4.5

Location of CA in the Hierarchical model

In the Hierarchical model, the smart grid manager would be acting as the root CA which
trust anchor of the whole secure communication and digitally signed and verifying the
certificates. The CA’s infrastructure within the auditable requirements is a complex task
which includes operational elements, hardware, software, policy framework and practice
statements, auditing and security infrastructure and personal. The CA’s should not issue
the digital certificates directly from the root distributed but instead by having the interim
or sub-CA’s in the architecture. Interim or Sub CA can be a SCADA master, and other
interim CA can be placed in the entity which is communicating to the remote substations.

The potential exposure of Root CA can be a weakness which is vulnerable to attackers, and
it should be out of reach of the internet. The intermediate CA in the SCADA master will
verify the certificates which the PLC or RTU connecting. The remote RTU or a smart meter
at the customer substations has the public certificate and the private key secured in the
meter.
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Figure 16. Intermediate CA between users for verification

4.6

Model Extension to other SCADA substations

The architecture tested was on hierarchical, and one to one model where the DNP3 SAv5
worked was on IP address on Wireless Area Network (WAN). The communication we
worked was Master, and Outstation like architecture and the packets were sent on Transport
Layer Secure (TLS). This is a standard model which is used in the SCADA architecture
from Keith et al. [1] in which we added a DNP3 SAv5 using PKI with certificate
verification. The authorization of the systems to connect and communication is managed
by the Intermediate Certificate Authority (CA). The communication of the system is done
TLS layer which provides Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of the device. This
also authorizes the authenticity of the device, and an added a layer of security to the private
key to avoiding physical tampering of the smart meter at the customer substation.
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Figure 17. Securing SCADA Architecture using the Certificate Authority (CA) in
DNP3 Protocol
rotocol

In [24], James H. Graham et al. proposed some cost effective implementation alternatives
with encryption and SSL/TLS layer report evaluation and in this research, we have
implemented the TLS 1.2 using the PKI and certificate verification.
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4.7

Vulnerabilities Defended and Countermeasures

Vulnerabilities in the DNP3 can be mitigated by the securely designing the architecture
using the SAv5 with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The communication vulnerabilities
of 23 attack instances can be defended by the design architecture proposed. The possible
DDoS, MITM, and tampering of the devices comprises of the 23 attacks and will discuss
the how the model can defend these attacks.

4.7.1 Tampering Physical Device
Tampering of the device physically can be mitigated with the securing the physical
devices with a password and access control to the device should be assigned. The
password protected device if cracked and have access to the private key and public
certificate there is a possible chance of penetrating the system and an Event Buffer
flooding attack by Dong Jin et al. [23]. . So in our design, we have given the password
for the private key that if any device to connect with their public certificate, the private
key needs a password to be operated. CA is needed to audit successful logins and login
attempts and verification of certificates. If the physical device is tampered and try to
authenticate with the device the public certificate should be verified with the Certificate
Authority (CA).
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4.7.2 Man in the Middle (MITM) Attack
If there is a Man in the Middle and uses a malicious certificate, the CA will ignore and
block the Man in the Middle (MITM). The certificate presented by the attacker will be
tested by the intermediate CA in the SCADA master or the PLC’s and will notify the
device is the CA signed the certificate or not. Verification of the certificate will allow
the design to have an added advantage of security and will block the Man in the Middle.
The communication is in TLS secured and encrypted which won’t allow an attacker to
sniff or spoof the packet.

4.7.3 Malicious Insider
Malicious entity acts as a threat to the SCADA system, such as an employee, former
employee, business associates who have access to information regarding the
organization’s security practices. The threat can be malicious software inside the
organization SCADA system which is also called as logic bombs. Access control in the
SCADA systems and authorization of the client should be managed to mitigate the
malicious insider. If an ex-employee has access to the SCADA systems, he can
penetrate the system for malicious purposes.

4.7.4 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Establishing a response plan and blocking the IP addresses at the network level to
protect these attacks. Recommendation for these attacks would be an Intrusion
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Detection system with a set of rules and access control of the IOT devices. Distribution
of intermediate CA to the other devices will avoid the single point bottleneck and stops
the DDoS attack from concentrating on the target.
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENTS

In this chapter, we demonstrate the research methodology and design of the Secure
Architecture version 5 of DNP3 using Public Key Infrastructure for authenticity
verification using Public Certificate. Firstly, the testbed will be explained and how the
installation of DNP3 open protocol from GitHub and the TCP communication. Secondly,
configuration changes according to the testbed which is used will be explained, and in the
third, the implementation of PKI - the creation of keys and certificate will be explained
using the OpenSSL. In the fourth, the implementation of verifying the entity using a public
certificate will be explained. Lastly, we will show the design and results of the
implementation of PKI. The evaluation of the design will show the screenshots of every
step of outputs in the execution phase.

5.1 Test Environment

We have made our test environment using a UNIX based operating system - Noobs,
running on Raspberry PI 3 model B with Wireless Area Network (WAN). The hierarchical
model consists of multiple master/outstation like architecture in SCADA systems, and
Raspberry PI model can run as an embedded system. The master outstation motherboard
was Raspberry PI 3 model B with the configuration of 802.11n Wireless LAN, 10/100Mbps
LAN Speed, Bluetooth 4.1, 4 USB ports, 40 GPIO pins.
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Image 1. Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Motherboard

We have opted for the Opendnp3 [33] which is a reference to DNP3 (IEEE – 1815) protocol
and is an open source from the GitHub [33]. Many DNP3 protocols are for commercial
use, and Automatak with the help of the author J. Adam Crain et al. [9] made this protocol
as open source. We have used the C++ version of DNP3 with GCC and G++ compilers
[34] and to build the system we have used the CMAKE [35]. ASIO is used as crossplatform for input and output communication for the Linux build environment. Firstly, the
operations were tested for the TCP communication in the below architecture where the
communication is open and with fewer security features.

46

Figure 18. DNP3 TCP/IP connection using Raspberry Pi on Wi-Fi Router

The OpenSSL cryptography library [36] is used for the Key generation, digital certificates
and TLS communication over the computer networks such as dynamic key generation for
securing the data with encryption which was propose by Neetesh et. al [25]. It is widely
used in the internet web servers, credit card transactions and communication on network
securely with the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). PKI is used to generate, distribute, store
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and revoke the digital certificate online using the public key encryption using the TLS
communication.
PKI has the root Certificate Authority (CA) which is at the top of the tree which is used to
sign all the certificates. A signature of the root has been assigned which is considered as
the intermediate CA or subordinate CA. Intermediate CA can verify the certificate signed
by the root CA which are distributed among the organization. In our design Master will be
assigned as an intermediate CA which will verify the certificate and the PKI design will be
implemented in the hierarchical architecture. In this architecture, the PKI connection used
the public certificate of the entities communicating and the Intermediate CA to verify the
certificate. Every entity or user has a public certificate, private key, and a peer certificate
to verify the file.

Figure 19. PKI Architecture of Distribution of Certificates
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5.2 Configuration for RPI – DNP3

Configuration for the DNP3 such as a change in the source code of the opendnp3 [33] and
internet on Wireless Are Network will be explained. From the given source code in
Tlsconfig.cpp, the Raspberry PI has a problem recognizing the destination of the certificate
and keys were placed in the SSLContect.cpp file. We have also used the socket connection
for the verification of the file when an entity sends a public certificate. Key generation and
certificate are generated from the Root CA. For the root CA, we have used a third entity
on a Kali Linux machine for the certificate storage and revocation list.

5.3 Implementation of PKI

The implementation of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with the use of openSSL[36] on
the DNP3 Secure Authentication Version 5(SAv5) with intermediate CA verification. We
have implemented the CA verification using the socket connection with Master or
Outstation sending the public certificate for verification. The implementation was designed
to run in two models depicting a third part CA using a different system on Internet Protocol
(IP). The second model runs on the Hierarchical model where Master, Outstation acts as
an intermediate CA to verify the files signed by the root CA. Every entity has a public
certificate, private key which is in a PKCS10 format which is translated as PEM.

49

The First model of the implementation has the Master acting as the Intermediate CA, and
Outstation sends its public certificate and master verify the signature of the file. Once
verified, a message will be sent verifying the authenticity of the device and details of the
certificate signed by the root CA. Later receiving the message, the outstation will send the
peer certificate to master and master to outstation for TLS connection will be decrypted by
the private keys of entities.
To secure customer substation, added an extra layer of security for the private key to
authenticate to other devices by keeping a password to authenticate for the decoding the
public certificate. In [26], Aamir Shahzad et. al has cryptographically implemented a
solution for secure DNP3 architecture on the application part of the stack but here in this
research, we have shown the application stack by implementing the application in real-time
on the IOT device.
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`

Figure 20. Verification of Outstation Certificate by Master as Intermediate CA

The second model has different intermediate CA on a different machine which is one to
one model, and it can verify the master public certificate sent by the outstation. Every entity
is communicating here on the Linux operating systems. After the verification message sent
to the outstation, the device will send its certificate and both the entities need the private
key password to decrypt the certificate. Later, the communication of the devices on the
DNP3 SAv5 on the TLS layer with encryption.

51

Figure 21. Verification of Outstation Certificate by Master as Intermediate CA

Both models can be used in the hierarchical and one to one architectures in SCADA
systems. The model illustrates how our PKI enhanced with intermediate CA will be used
in the distribution substation to connect with a smart meter at a customer substation.
Physical tampering at the customer will be a security threat to the organization, so we have
added an added layer of security by giving password protection of the private key. When a
customer sends a public certificate, it will be verified by an intermediate CA, and then a
TLS connection will be established. This architecture communicates on the secure layer
with authenticity verification and also blocking a security threat at customer substation.
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Figure 22. Verification of Outstation Certificate at Customer Substation by
Master as Intermediate CA

5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of simulations run on DNP3 SAv5 using Public Key
Infrastructure. Using the Hierarchical model, we built a model where the master
communicating with outstations and the verification of the public certificate are shown.
Later, the password for the private key will be given for decrypting the public certificate.
Connection for TLS communication between master outstation will be shown, and the
secure layer communication is captured using the Wireshark application [37]. The captured
packet is shown for the TLS communication and encrypted data packet.
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Image 2. Certificate Authority Verification

Image 3. Outstation Certificate verification, and Private Key Password Request
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Image 4. Master Private Key Password Request

Image 5. Master certificate decryption and connection with Outstation
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Image 6. Outstation Certificate decryption and connection with Master

Image 7. Master receiving DNP3 messages
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Image 8. Wireshark Capture

Image 9. TLS version 1.2 Encrypted Data Packet
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This research presented the secure architecture of DNP3 SAv5 in a SCADA system test
environment to be used for the secure communication. The developed test environment
was to illustrate the secure communication with the help of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) in the SCADA systems. We have also explained how PKI plays a significant part
in digitally signing a certificate and securely transferring messages between the SCADA
systems. The test illustrated the TLS communication between a distribution and
customer substation to defend the attacks such tampering or Man in the middle cyberattacks. We have added a layer of security such as intermediate CA verification and
Private Key file password. This will allow the authenticity of the entity is verified and
also block the physical tampering of the device.

Results show the feasibility of protecting the cyber-attacks from various research done
on the vulnerability assessment on DNP3 communication in an Industrial control system
environment. Our next stage is to enhance the architecture by adding detection models
for the different network system attacks.
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CHAPTER VIII
SOURCE CODE
1.1 OUTSTATION CODE
#include <asiodnp3/DNP3Manager.h>
#include <asiodnp3/PrintingSOEHandler.h>
#include <asiodnp3/PrintingChannelListener.h>
#include <asiodnp3/ConsoleLogger.h>
#include <asiodnp3/UpdateBuilder.h>
#include <asiopal/UTCTimeSource.h>
#include <opendnp3/outstation/SimpleCommandHandler.h>
#include <opendnp3/outstation/Database.h>
#include <opendnp3/LogLevels.h>
#include <string>
#include <thread>
#include <iostream>
#include<sys/socket.h>
#include<sys/types.h>
#include<netinet/in.h>
#include<netdb.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
#include <sstream>
#include<sys/syscall.h>
using
using
using
using
using

namespace
namespace
namespace
namespace
namespace

std;
opendnp3;
openpal;
asiopal;
asiodnp3;

#define PORT 5555
#define BACKLOG 5
void ConfigureDatabase(DatabaseConfig& config)
{
// example of configuring analog index 0 for Class2
with floating point variations by default
config.analog[0].clazz = PointClass::Class2;
config.analog[0].svariation =
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StaticAnalogVariation::Group30Var5;
config.analog[0].evariation =
EventAnalogVariation::Group32Var7;
}
struct State
{
uint32_t count = 0;
double value = 0;
bool binary = false;
DoubleBit dbit = DoubleBit::DETERMINED_OFF;
};
void AddUpdates(UpdateBuilder& builder, State& state,
const std::string& arguments);
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
int socket1, socket_accept;
int bnd,lstn;
char buf[2048]={' '};
char data[2048] = {' '};
struct sockaddr_in server,client;
//create socket
socket1=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
if(socket1<0)
{
cout<<"Error creating socket\n";
return 0;
}
cout<<"Socket created\n";
server.sin_family=AF_INET;
server.sin_port=htons(PORT);
server.sin_addr.s_addr=INADDR_ANY;
//Bind socket
bnd=bind(socket1,(struct sockaddr
*)&server,sizeof(server));
if(bnd==-1)
{
cout<<"Error binding\n";
return 0;
}
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//listen for socket
lstn=listen(socket1,BACKLOG);
if(lstn==-1)
{
cout<<"Error listening\n";
return 0;
}
cout<<"Server is listening\n";
socklen_t len=sizeof(client);
socket_accept=accept(fd1,(struct
sockaddr*)&client,&len);
if(socket_accept==0)
{
cout<<"Error accepting\n";
return 0;
}
cout<<"Connected with Certificate Authority"<<endl;
//send Certificate file
int from;
from=open("Uday.cert.pem",O_RDONLY);
if(from<0)
{
cout<<"Error opening file\n";
return 0;
}
int n=1;
int s;
while((n=read(from,buf,sizeof(buf)))!=0)
{
//s=send(fd2,buf,sizeof(buf),0);
s=write(socket_accept,buf,n);
if(s<0)
{
cout<<"error sending\n";return 0;
}
break;
}
cout<<"Sent Certificate for Verification"<<endl;
int rec;
while(1)
{
rec = recv(socket_accept,data, sizeof(data), 0);
perror("rec");
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if(rec<0)
{
cout<<"Error Receiving\n";
}
cout<< "Verified Certificate with Certificate
Authority with:"<<data <<endl;
break;
}
if (argc != 4)
{
std::cout << "usage: master-gprs-tls-demo <ca
certificate> <certificate chain> <private key>" <<
std::endl;
return -1;
}
std::string caCertificate(argv[1]);
std::string certificateChain(argv[2]);
std::string privateKey(argv[3]);
std::cout << "Using CA certificate: " << caCertificate
<< std::endl;
std::cout << "Using certificate chain: " <<
certificateChain << std::endl;
std::cout << "Using private key file: " << privateKey
<< std::endl;
// Specify what log levels to use. NORMAL is warning
and above
// You can add all the comms logging by uncommenting
below.
const uint32_t FILTERS = levels::NORMAL; // |
levels::ALL_COMMS;
// This is the main point of interaction with the
stack
// Allocate a single thread to the pool since this is
a single outstation
DNP3Manager manager(1, ConsoleLogger::Create());
std::error_code ec;
// Create a TCP server (listener)
auto channel = manager.AddTLSClient(
"server",
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FILTERS,
ChannelRetry::Default(),
"192.168.0.100",
"0.0.0.0",
20001,
TLSConfig(
caCertificate,
certificateChain,
privateKey,
2
),
PrintingChannelListener::Create(),
ec
);
if (ec)
{
std::cout << "Unable to create tls server: " <<
ec.message() << std::endl;
return ec.value();
}
// The main object for a outstation. The defaults are
useable,
// but understanding the options are important.
OutstationStackConfig
stackConfig(DatabaseSizes::AllTypes(10));
// specify the maximum size of the event buffers
stackConfig.outstation.eventBufferConfig =
EventBufferConfig::AllTypes(10);
// you can override an default outstation parameters
here
// in this example, we've enabled the oustation to use
unsolicted reporting
// if the master enables it
stackConfig.outstation.params.allowUnsolicited = true;
// You can override the default link layer settings
here
// in this example we've changed the default link
layer addressing
stackConfig.link.LocalAddr = 10;
stackConfig.link.RemoteAddr = 1;
// You can optionally change the default reporting
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variations or class assignment prior to enabling the
outstation
ConfigureDatabase(stackConfig.dbConfig);
// Create a new outstation with a log level, command
handler, and
// config info this returns a thread-safe interface
used for
// updating the outstation's database.
auto outstation = channel->AddOutstation("outstation",
SuccessCommandHandler::Create(),
DefaultOutstationApplication::Create(), stackConfig);
// Enable the outstation and start communications
outstation->Enable();
// variables used in example loop
string input;
State state;
while (true)
{
std::cout << "Enter one or more measurement changes
then press <enter>" << std::endl;
std::cout << "c = counter, b = binary, d =
doublebit, a = analog, 'quit' = exit" << std::endl;
std::cin >> input;
if (input == "quit") return 0;
else
{
UpdateBuilder builder;
AddUpdates(builder, state, input);
outstation->Apply(builder.Build());
}
}
return 0;
}
void AddUpdates(UpdateBuilder& builder, State& state,
const std::string& arguments)
{
for (const char& c : arguments)
{
switch (c)
{
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case('c'):
{
builder.Update(Counter(state.count), 0);
++state.count;
break;
}
case('a'):
{
builder.Update(Analog(state.value), 0);
state.value += 1;
break;
}
case('b'):
{
builder.Update(Binary(state.binary), 0);
state.binary = !state.binary;
break;
}
case('d'):
{
builder.Update(DoubleBitBinary(state.dbit),
0);
state.dbit = (state.dbit ==
DoubleBit::DETERMINED_OFF) ? DoubleBit::DETERMINED_ON :
DoubleBit::DETERMINED_OFF;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
}

